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Question 
(a) identify and briefly summarise key elements and delivery structures of programmes focused 
on the transformation of markets/sectors which primarily DFID, but also other donors, have done 
in DFID priority countries; 
(b) to provide evidence on which private sector/market focussed interventions have been 
successful in promoting competitiveness, creating jobs and improving the economic growth to 
poverty transmission, 
(c) while, drawing out findings from a) and b) related to South Asia, particularly Pakistan. 
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1. Summary 
This rapid literature review summarizes the existing evidence (mainly programme business 
cases, annual reviews, logical frameworks, etc.) on selected sector programs run by DFID in 
priority countries.  
This report will discuss five key DFID sector programmes that can offer lessons for future 
potential sector development programmes (e.g. in Pakistan). The programmes discussed here 
are/were run mainly by DFID in its priority partner countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region.1 
A brief summary of the five selected sector programmes will be provided in this section. These 
programmes will be discussed further in detail in section 3).  
 Kenya Market Assistance Programme (MAP)  
o The program is run by DFID over the 2012-2020 period in Kenya with a budget of 
£48.2M. 
o Programme’s partners include Kenya Gatsby Charitable Trust (KGT). 
o The programme’s objective is to ‘build effective markets’ and ‘access to markets’ 
in sectors such as agriculture, livestock and water.  
o The programme will work with ‘market actors’ including the private sector, 
government, civil society organizations.  
o The programme has three core components. Namely; the Kenya Markets Trust 
(KMT), Youth Employment, and Extractives. KMT is by far the biggest of these 
three components. 
o Programme Interventions will be carried out via the Making Markets Work for the 
Poor (M4P) method – which is the central Private Sector Development strategy of 
DFID. The programme prioritises arid and semi-arid lands because poverty rates 
are bigger in communities living in these geographical locations of Kenya. 
o Latest available project reviews suggest that the programme has met 
expectations. 
o However, reviews advised the programme to re-assess the appropriateness and 
level of ‘ambition’ of the results framework.   
o The programme also faced staffing challenges linked to the uncertainty of future 
funding. 
 
 Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS) 
o The program was run by DFID over the 2009-2017 period in Nigeria with a 
budget of £91.1m. 
o The programme aimed to boost growth and employment across six sectors of the 
Nigerian economy. It additionally targeted business environment reform.  
o Under a set of four interventions, the programme targeted the following sectors:  
                                                   
1 These sample projects reviewed by the case studies here were selected not necessarily on their success rate 
but based on suggestions from a DFID private sector development expert (i.e. prior expert knowledge of the 
relevance of these projects to upcoming/potential DFID private sector programmes in Pakistan). 
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 GEMS 1 - Meat and Leather; 
 GEMS 2 - Construction and Real Estate; 
 GEMS 3 - the Business Environment; and  
 GEMS 4 - Wholesale and Retail sectors. 
o Additionally, the World Bank Growth and Employment component of the 
programme targeted the Tourism, Hospitality, Entertainment, ICT & Light 
Manufacturing sectors. 
o The overarching target of the programme (and its sub-components) was to assist 
the development of non-oil sectors in Nigeria. 
o Overall, the project has fulfilled expectations and received good annual reviews 
for much of its lifespan. 
o The exception is GEMS 2, which was closed early since it failed to fully achieve 
its present objectives in time. 
o One key challenge noted by project review was linked to the set-up of the project 
as a suite of interacting projects. It was noted that collaboration was less effective 
among different components. 
 
 The BEAM Exchange (Building Effective and Accessible Markets)  
o The program was run by DFID over the 2014-2017 period with a budget of £4m. 
o Programme partners include the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation 
(which contributed £1m to the programme). 
o The programme was designed as a facility for knowledge exchange and learning 
about the role of market systems approaches in the fight against poverty. 
o BEAM’s tried to spread and strengthen the application of market systems 
approaches. It has done so by helping to disseminate good practices through 
lesson-learning and experience-sharing. 
o The internal annual reviews of the program as well as an independent external 
review confirm the success of the project in attaining desired targets.  
o There are recommendations for the continuity of the program (be it in a scaled-up 
or scaled-down version). 
 
 Jobs Compact Ethiopia  
o The program will be run by DFID over the 2017-2023 period in Ethiopia with a 
budget of £80m. 
o The programme will support the industrialisation plan/process in Ethiopia.  
o The target is to facilitate the creation of over 100,000 jobs for Ethiopians and 
refugees residing in Ethiopia.  
o An important component is the eventual relaxation of the Ethiopian labour market 
so that 30,000 refugees will be able to participate in the local labour market. 
o Given that the project has been recently launched, it was not possible to have a 
formal review. 
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 Dar es Salaam Urban Jobs Programme 
o This sector program will be run by DFID over the 2018-2023 period in Tanzania 
(Dar es Salaam) with a budget of £10m. 
o The project will be very useful for the city since it suffers from a considerable 
unemployment problem (where unemployment rates in the city is more than twice 
the national rate) - particularly among the young people in urban areas. 
o The programme is essentially an ‘urban market systems programme’. 
o It plans to realize sustainable change in sectors that have a better chance of 
creating jobs and incomes for poor people – especially vulnerable groups such as 
women and young people. 
o Initial sectors targeted by the program include manufacturing, waste and childcare 
sectors.  
o Just like Ethiopian Jobs Compact, a full annual review is not yet available for the 
project – owing to the programme’s recent launch in 2018.   
 
2. Introduction: sector transformation programmes 
Even if there is no formal definition of ‘sector transformation programmes’, the literature 
notes that they refer to development interventions (or set of interventions) that target 
specific sectors (or sets of specific sectors) – as opposed to interventions aiming at 
economy-wide transformation (Balchin et al., 2019; McMillan et al., 2017; Lin and Monga, 
2017). The literature also stresses the suitability of sector transformation programmes for 
developing countries since development gains can be made in particular sectors - even in the 
face of political or institutional difficulties (McMillan et al., 2017; Lin and Monga, 2017). 
A recent case-study on multi-country sector development programmes (Balchin et al., 2019) that 
was conducted in partnership between Gatsby Africa and ODI noted that economy-wide 
transformations appear to be driven by the growth of particular sectors through which a 
country develops ‘capabilities’ and boosts ‘productivity’ - before shifting/expanding 
further into related or yet more productive sectors of its economy.  
For their analysis, Balchin et al. (2019) rely on a list of six cases of ‘successful’ sector 
transformations and five ‘failed’ cases. The list of successful cases derives from Ethiopian 
Airlines, The automotive industry in South Africa, Cocobod in Ghana, Indonesia’s staple food 
revolution, Garments in Bangladesh, and Sector-based strategies in Mauritius. The lessons they 
drive for failed efforts at sector transformations is based on their case studies on Cashew nuts 
sector in Mozambique, Pineapples in Ghana, Maize production/subsidy policy in Malawi, 
President Kikwete’s rice initiative in Tanzania, and Malaysia’s manufacturing sector. 
Balchin et al. (2019) note that fruitful sector transformations are backed by suitable public 
actions. Some of the key elements of public support seen in the literature (among other 
factors) include: 
 Credible commitments to investors that their assets and profits will be safe from 
unwarranted expropriation: for instance; 
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o the successful Ethiopian ‘Air transport and logistics’ project had “consistent state 
backing and credible long-term policy vision for expansion articulated in 
successive vision documents.” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 46) 
o in the case of the successful ‘Cocoa revival’ project in Ghana, “the key sector 
institution has been continuously run on a professional basis and with tight rules 
on e.g. marketing margins, and this is underpinned by the above-mentioned 
cross-party political logic.” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 47) 
o in the case of the unsuccessful ‘Cashew nuts’ project in Mozambique, 
“Government’s credibility undermined by perceptions that the policy reforms were 
World Bank-driven. Reform policies poorly communicated to cashew farmers.” 
(Balchin et al., 2019; p. 49) 
o in the case of the unsuccessful ‘Rice Initiative’ in Tanzania, “the informal politics 
of food importing weakened the initiative’s credibility” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 50) 
 
 Suitable supply of relevant public goods, together with social and physical 
infrastructure: for example; 
o the successful Ethiopian ‘Air transport and logistics’ project enjoyed “coordinated 
public infrastructure investments alongside the airline’s expansion (e.g. 
expansion and improvement of airport).” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 46) 
o in the case of the successful ‘Cocoa revival’ project in Ghana, “key public goods 
functions such as quality control have been well performed by Cocobod. Needed 
productivity enhancing measures have had only limited success.” (Balchin et al., 
2019; p. 47) 
o in the case of the unsuccessful ‘Cashew nuts’ project in Mozambique, “export 
liberalisation reforms were not backed by sufficient investment to support 
smallholders to boost yields and output.” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 49) 
o in the case of the unsuccessful ‘Rice Initiative’ in Tanzania, “public goods 
provision was biased to new works, on which district politicians gained kick-
backs. O&M was not politically interesting and got neglected.” (Balchin et al., 
2019; p. 50) 
 
 Anticipating and amending investment coordination failures: for instance; 
o the successful Ethiopian ‘Air transport and logistics’ project enjoyed “Coordination 
and sequencing of investment in public infrastructure alongside EAL’s own capital 
investment (e.g. in cargo and maintenance). The latter was facilitated by allowing 
EAL to reinvest all profits to build up capital for expansionary investments.” 
(Balchin et al., 2019; p. 46) 
o the case of the successful ‘Cocoa revival’ project in Ghana enjoyed “coordination 
with land and credit issues, both of these more politically challenging, has not 
been effectively provided, giving rise to some concerns about the long-term 
prospects of the industry.” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 47) 
o the unsuccessful ‘Cashew nuts’ project in Mozambique suffered from “little effort 
to coordinate investments to boost raw cashew nut production after export 
liberalisation.” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 49) 
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o the unsuccessful ‘Rice Initiative’ in Tanzania, suffered from “absent coordination 
of trade and investment policies was the main problem.” (Balchin et al., 2019; p. 
50) 
 
3. Case studies: DFID Sector transformation programmes 
3.1. Kenya Market Assistance Programme (MAP) 
Title:  Kenya Markets Assistance Programme (MAP) 
Programme Value: £48.2M  
Programme Code:  202698 Start Date: August 
2012 
End Date: March 2020 
Source: MAP Annual Review (2018, p. 1). Licensed under  the Open Government Licence v3.0 
 
The Market Access Programme, MAP, was tendered in 2010 with provision for design, delivery 
and scale up. MAP was won by a consortium with an international advisory lead, Adam 
Smith International, working with local partners including Kenya Gatsby Charitable Trust 
(KGT), experienced in local markets, with linkages into a regional enterprise network, and access 
to the resources of the UK Gatsby Charitable Foundation (MAP Annual Review, 2018; MAP 
Business Case, 2012).   
The Kenya Markets Assistance Programme (MAP) aims to build accessible and effective 
markets by harnessing the underlying sources of poor performance in markets that are 
most important to poor people, such as agriculture, livestock and water. Some examples of 
underlying causes of poor performance in markets include inadequate access to information, 
insufficient knowledge and poorly designed and/or applied standards of 
certification/accreditation. To enhance markets, MAP works with ‘market actors’ encompassing 
the private sector, government, civil society and membership organizations (MAP Annual 
Review, 2018). 
The programme originally included three core components: 
1. Kenya Markets Trust (KMT) (£38.3M), which primarily backs the agriculture, livestock and 
water sectors in Kenya. This component is implemented by KMT and is co-funded by Gatsby 
Africa which donates a grant of £3M as well as £1M worth of technical assistance to fortify 
portfolio delivery and governance of the institution.  
2. Youth Employment (£5.5M), which endorsed job creation for youth in Mombasa County. 
This component was carried out by Adam Smith International (ASI). 
3. Extractives (£4.4M), which enhanced the governance of the extractives sector in Kenya. 
This component was executed by Adam Smith International (ASI) (MAP Annual Review, 
2018, p. 1) 
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Based on the KGT Business Plan, an accepted outcome of the design phase, MAP will widen 
over time to focus on 8 markets with the possibility to impact the situation of the poor. 
Interventions try to improve incentives in the market, sustainably generating higher household 
incomes and more jobs. Interventions are designed using the Making Markets Work for the Poor 
(M4P) method which is situated at the heart of the DFID Private Sector Development strategy. 
Over time, the selected markets work will focus more on arid and semi-arid lands where poverty 
rates are high (MAP Logical Framework, 2016; MAP Business Case, 2012). 
Theory of Change 
The programme will attain results by applying interventions which target the systemic 
restraints deterring the participation of poor people in selected market systems. The 
interventions will be designed to readjust incentive structures, rules, relationships and support 
services which mould the way markets work and change the way poor people take part in, and 
access markets. The programme theory of change is summed up in Figure 1 below.  Behind the 
programme theory of change, every markets system has a thorough results chain and individual 
theory of change linked to it.  This theory of change is reinforced by work carried out on M4P 
programme design somewhere else, and evidence compiled from completed programmes (MAP 
Business Case, 2012).   
Figure 1: Programme theory of change (MAP) 
 
Source: MAP Business Case (2012, p. 14). Licensed under:  the Open Government Licence v3.0  
 
The main assumptions behind the theory of change are:  
 Interventions activate changes in the incentives of key market actors, who will reply 
with improved services, better/equitable rules of the game and policies, and a upgraded 
quality debate about the role of markets, boosting growth and access opportunities for 
the poor and low income small scale farmers and entrepreneurs (i.e. the target groups); 
Poverty reduction 
Enterprise  
performance 
Market system  
change 
Systemic intervention 
Impact: Improvements in enterprise performance and better behaving 
market stakeholders results in jobs and net income growth among target 
beneficiaries attributable to the programme, and to improved policy. This 
leads to increased job creation. 
Outcome: Better functioning markets and increased capacity leads to 
improved enterprise performance among target beneficiaries, jobs, and 
increased incomes.  Enhanced understanding of market roles and better 
incentives drive more and more people to engage in better markets. 
,  
Outputs: Stimulating sustainable change in market systems and the capacity of 
KGT to act on wider stakeholders creates better functioning markets, improved 
policies and increased market system capacity. This increases growth and 
access opportunities among beneficiaries. 
 
Activities: Programme activities target the underlying systemic constraints 
affecting pro poor growth within selected markets in a sustainable and 
caytic way; with market actors in enterprises, policy and regulatory roles. 
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 Small-scale poor farmers and entrepreneurs will advance their business practices. 
This successively leads to advanced productivity, lower costs of production, rising sales 
and economic diversification. Enhanced enterprise performance generates higher 
household income and growth;  
 As momentum is generated and communicated into the market, a turning point will be 
achieved that will draw in other market actors – who will duplicate the changing 
behaviours - a process known as ‘crowding in’ (MAP Business Case, 2012). 
Annual Reviews 
 
Year 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Programme Score A+ A A+ B A A 
Risk Rating Medium Medium Moderate Major Major Major 
Source: MAP Annual Review (2018, p. 1). Licensed under:  the Open Government Licence v3.0 
In general, the programme’s performance (on output indicators) met anticipation. As such, 
having considered both quantitative and qualitative results including through beneficiary 
interviews and field visits, the most recent review (from 2018) has assigned a programme an 
‘A’ score (i.e. that it met expectation). By increasing market opportunities through innovation, 
supporting competition in sectors, and ultimately creating a market system that is profitable for 
investors, increasing income for suppliers and benefiting consumers, the program is on track to 
achieve the outcome objective of job creation and increased income among poor households. In 
addition, by improving the way poor people interact with markets, MAP has contributed to the big 
four agenda of the Kenyan government (specifically on food security), as well as the UK's 
priorities for inclusive growth in Kenya. Increased agricultural productivity is very important for 
food security and poverty alleviation (MAP Annual Review, 2018). 
Recommendations from annual reviews and evaluations (Annual Review, 2018) 
1. Programs need to strengthen portfolio oversight, including technical guidance and 
direction for sector teams. However, this was not prioritized adequately by the leadership 
and the KMT board, and was considered to have influenced the pace of implementation. 
KMT has hired a technical expert to work with the team, and is in the process of 
recruiting for the head of the program. KMT leadership must ensure that these two roles 
are put to good use to strengthen portfolio quality. For example, it is necessary to 
have an action plan on how the technical advisor will interact with, and train the 
portfolio team (MAP Annual Review, 2018). 
2. After the update of the KMT sector strategy is completed (expected to be completed by 
December 2018), DFID, Gatsby Africa and KMT must reassess the suitability and 
ambition of the current results framework. However, the revised results framework 
must consider the fact that MAP is nearing completion (MAP Annual Review, 2018). 
3. KMT’s sustainability remains the most significant risk to the programme and KMT is likely 
to lose key staff in the remaining period of DFID funding if no clarity on future 
sustainability/funding is achieved quickly. DFID, Gatsby Africa and the KMT board should 
prioritise this risk and a contingency plan should be developed to prepare for a 
scenario where no further funding is secured (MAP Annual Review, 2018).  
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4. MAP signifies DFID’s main intervention in the agriculture, livestock and water sectors in 
Kenya. The recent DFID Kenya Country Development Diagnostic confirmed the role of 
agriculture for poverty reduction in Kenya. With MAP closing in March 2020 DFID Kenya 
should look for future options for interventions in the agriculture, livestock and 
water sectors in Kenya, via a portfolio board discussion (MAP Annual Review, 
2018). 
5. KMT needs to review the teaming structure of the programmes and the skillsets of 
the senior leadership to make sure that contingency plans are ready to alleviate 
risk of loss of key personnel (MAP Annual Review, 2018).  
Whilst evaluations of the MAP programme are not plenty, evidence collected by ITAD highlights 
the importance of iteration in programme design. One of the MAP projects has promoted the 
uptake of artificial insemination services for livestock. Initial analysis indicated high prices were 
the barrier to increased uptake of these services. Nevertheless, over time it became clear that 
lack of transparency and honesty among sellers of services was a great challenge. This 
demonstrates the need to be prepared to revise the theory of change, and not to stick firmly to 
output indicators (in this case, prices) once the knowledge of a market system improves 
(O’Sullivan, 2016: 17). 
3.2. Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS) 
Title:   
Growth and Employment in States 
Programme Value:  £91.1m  
Programme Code:  
 
Start Date: 18/5/09 End Date: 31/7/2017 
Source: GEMS Project Completion Review (2018: 1). Licensed under:  the Open Government 
Licence v3.0 
 
The Growth and Employment in States (GEMS) programme is a seven-year programme, jointly 
funded by DFID Nigeria (£91 million) and the World Bank (£105 million). The programme 
intends to increase growth and employment across six sectors of the Nigerian economy, 
as well as through business environment reform. The DFID-funded sector portfolio 
encompasses:  
 GEMS 1 - Meat and Leather, which began in 2010 and ended in September 2015;  
 GEMS 2 - Construction and Real Estate, which began activities in April 2010 (but was 
closed at the end of December 2013);  
 GEMS 3 - the Business Environment, which began in August 2010; and  
 GEMS 4 - Wholesale and Retail, which began in August 2012.  
The World Bank Growth and Employment component became operational in 2014 and is 
supporting sectors including Tourism, Hospitality, Entertainment, ICT & Light Manufacturing. The 
overall objective of the programmes was to nurture non-oil sector economic growth in selected 
states in Nigeria (GEMS Annual Review 2017; GEMS Project Completion Review, 2018).   
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GEMS 1 started in-country operations in March 2010, and concluded September 2015. It 
concentrated on improving the livelihoods of poor women and men in the meat and leather sector 
by putting on a “Making Markets Work for the Poor” (M4P) approach. The states where GEMS 1 
functioned included Abuja, Aba, Lagos, Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, Zamfara and Katsina (GEMS 
Project Completion Review, 2018). 
 GEMS 1 followed 3 indicators at the Impact level related to income and employment. The 
income target was to help 120,000 people (50,000 poor/2,090 women) with actual 
achievements of 237,200 people (124,650 poor/19,490 women). Total income target was 
₤24.7 million, with a total of ₤42 million attained. The employment target was 4,400 full 
time equivalents, with 4,076 achieved by the end of June 2015, i.e. approximately 92% of 
the target (GEMS Project Completion Review, 2018). 
 GEMS 1 delivered many opportunities for other projects as well as private sector actors 
(i.e. also for service providers involved throughout the project), to continue the work of 
the project. Several of the interventions developed by GEMS 1 were passed on to other 
projects (both within and outside the GEMS suite) to guarantee that positive market 
system initiatives lead to sustainable change (GEMS Project Completion Review, 2018). 
The overall objective of GEMS 2 was to reinforce the performance of market systems in the 
construction and real estate sector in order for these sectors to perform more effectively and 
provide enlarged opportunities (i.e. jobs and income) for the poor, and for women in particular in 
the sector. The GEMS 2 project was expected to run from early 2010 until 2015. Nevertheless, 
DFID Nigeria decided to close the project early – in 2013 - based on their valuation that it was 
improbable to achieve its objectives within the remaining project lifetime. A detailed lesson 
learning exercise was carried out to assess the difficulties encountered by GEMS2, with a report 
detailing the findings (GEMS Project Completion Review, 2018). 
GEMS3 more than exceeded its logframe targets through its interventions. By the time of the 
programme’s end, GEMS3 had attained the following: an annual income upsurge of at least 15% 
for more than 1.3m people (of these; an aggregated, cumulative rise in income of £564m; and an 
growth in employment of 15,600 full time equivalent jobs (GEMS Project Completion Review, 
2018). 
As well as these specific results in Nigeria, GEMS 3 has also developed wide-ranging 
approaches to reform during its life. The models have become highly developed in the areas of 
tax and land, including focus on relevant regulation, training, public-private dialogue and 
sensitisation. On the other hand, the investment work stream was not quite so well advanced, 
reflecting the fact that it was a newer area of activity for GEMS 3. Nevertheless, considerable 
advances have been made here too. The team also concentrated more on ensuring the 
sustainability of its activities and gave much needed thought to understanding what realizes 
‘systemic change’. This led to clear choices to focus on achieving ‘proof of concept’ in their 
intervention areas. In the case of tax and land, for instance, these are now well-embedded in the 
relevant state ministries. Work with national-level organisations such as the Joint Tax Board 
(JTB) and Nigerian Governors Forum (NGF) provided a good basis for the reforms to be 
sustained and rolled-out further into other Nigerian states (GEMS Project Completion Review, 
2018). 
GEMS 4 also reached the end of implementation with a strong performance, achieving 15 
of the 16 log frame targets. At the output level, all targets were met or exceeded, occasionally 
by considerable margins. Likewise, at the Outcome level, all 5 targets were met or exceeded. Of 
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the 3 Impact targets, the project did not attain the income levels, but met those for jobs and 
outreach. The programme had faced momentous challenges, as identified for example by the 
2014 MTR. By the time of the 2016 Annual Review, it became clear that whilst results were being 
achieved in the field, these were not being translated to the Impact level indicators (GEMS 
Project Completion Review, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the initial lag in broadening the scope of activity, followed by the delay in 
converging back in on the successful intervention areas, put the project behind the curve 
in attaining Impact results. Whereas the jobs and outreach targets have been met, the 
achievement of only 55% of the income target is unsatisfactory (GEMS Project Completion 
Review, 2018). 
Theory of Change 
The GEMS projects are complex and ambitious (which is the case with many M4P programmes). 
As described above, it takes a considerable amount of resources to continually develop, revisit, 
test and refine intervention logics across the range of interventions a typical M4P project will be 
handling at any given phase in its project lifetime (GEMS ECORYS, 2015). 
The rationale for the intervention logic is to outline the background information and data 
collection that is needed to be confident that change is happening and to deliver robust evidence 
that systemic change is starting to happen and is developing along the trajectory imagined in the 
intervention logic. Without a well-functioning intervention logic system, which is integrated into 
project management structures, it is uncertain whether a project can really benefit from the 
advantages of the approach (GEMS ECORYS, 2015). 
GEMS 1 experiences highlight the levels of expertise needed not only in developing robust 
intervention logics, but also managing them as project implementation accelerates. Expertise is 
also needed at field level to translate back and forth between intervention logics and the realities 
of results in the market. GEMS 1 had to invest heavily in extensive coaching to develop 
intervention managers ability to ‘argue’ the progress of their projects (and the constraints faced) 
based on their documented intervention logics (GEMS ECORYS, 2015). 
See: Figure 2: Theory of Change GEMS1, GEMS (2015: 5). https://www.enterprise-
development.org/wp-content/uploads/GEMS1Annex1Achievements.pdf  
The GEMS projects provide valuable learning on the use of the log frame, Theory of Change and 
intervention logics as tools for project management. So as to serve as valuable management 
decision-making tools, projects need to guarantee that individually and collectively these tools 
are kept ‘live’; they need to be well matched to each other and frequently revisited and reviewed 
based on emerging and credible information from the market place (GEMS ECORYS, 2015). 
Annual Reviews and evaluations 
Year 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 
Programme Score X B A A+ A+ A A+ 
Risk Rating M M M M M M M 
Source: GEMS Project Completion Review (2018; p.1).  Licensed under:  the Open Government 
Licence v3.0 
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Recommendations from reviews (Project Completion Review, 2018) 
The Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Project (IMEP) was commissioned to undertake an 
interlinked Mid-Term Review (MTR) and Lesson Learning Review of the DFID-funded GEMS 
components in Nigeria in May-June 2014. A report from the Independent Monitoring and 
Evaluation Project for the State Level Programmes (IMEP) (2015) collected lessons learned from 
GEMS 1, 3 and 4, and those collected from the GEMS 2 lesson learning review conducted in 
December 2013. Learning themes span project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and 
sustainability and the suitability of the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach in the 
different GEMS settings. The realities of applying M4P principles and methodology in complex 
and dynamic markets and how particular GEMS components are inducing systemic change in 
markets are also guiding themes to this Review.  
1. Donors and service providers have to agree on a clearly articulated vision for the target 
sector(s), or Theory of Change, at the outset of the programme.  
2. Programme design must be informed (and developed) on the basis of sound market 
analysis. Donors must allow projects to conduct adequate market analysis early, so that 
interventions can be properly designed.  
3. Project management log frames should not only include quantitative indicators, but also 
qualitative indicators that show systemic changes and impacts.  
4. DFID should also consider how the Annual Review process (including content of the 
ARIES template) could be more valuable to projects.  
5. The GEMS programme was set up as a suite of interacting projects. Though, a lack of 
coordination in the log frames meant collaboration was less effective.  
6. The use of the DCED standards for results measurement is a sound basis for assessing 
impact - irrespective of the approach being taken.  
7. The GEMS projects were planned to use a standardized approach to results 
measurement, ‘the Handbook’. More attention should be given to ways to reflect on the 
usefulness of the handbook and to review and upgrade the approaches - if this approach 
across a suite of programmes is to be used.  
8. Unintended outcomes or results (i.e. whether positive or negative) are likely to occur over 
the course of a programme. Allowing the flexibility in the initial project design to respond 
to these is useful. 
9. The public private engagement mechanism (PPEM) and public private dialogue (PPD) 
methods applied by GEMS 3 are both fruitful components of the project’s strategic 
framework and would be useful in the context of other market system development 
programmes.  
10. Both GEMS 1 and 3 effectively used the model/approach of embedding technical 
expertise from the project with partners. The aspects of this approach that has helped the 
projects to succeed will provide useful lessons for a broader market system development 
programme audience.  
11. Donors, including DFID, should back research and development for introducing more 
innovative tools and approaches. Successful projects will use a range of delivery 
mechanisms and will not be limited to working within one approach.  
12. The use of ratings and weightings could be further inspected and considered by DFID 
Nigeria and other donors (with respect to VFM and impact), so as to address the 
challenge of demonstrating results and VFM while value takes time to generate. 
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3.3. BEAM Exchange (Building Effective and Accessible 
Markets) 
Title:  The BEAM Exchange (Building Effective and Accessible Markets) 
Programme Value: £4m (DFID contribution is £3m, Swiss 
Agency for Development Cooperation £1m) 
 
Programme Code: 203732 
 
Start Date: April 2014 End Date: March 2017 
Source: BEAM Annual Review (2016). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
 
The BEAM Exchange (or ‘BEAM’) is a platform for knowledge exchange and learning about the 
role of market systems approaches in fighting poverty. 
DFID has a strong interest in improving the efficiency and impact of these approaches, given its 
large portfolio of programmes that include aspects of market system development. BEAM’s 
outcome objective is to reinforce and extend the application of market systems approaches, by 
supporting the spread of good practice and facilitating lesson-learning and experience-sharing 
(BEAM Annual Review, 2016). 
To do so, BEAM is building a community among policy-advisors, consultants, practitioners and 
businesses, supporting those who design, manage, implement, evaluate and participate in 
development programmes. It is enhancing access to field-orientated guidance and evidence of 
good practice and results; facilitating events and spaces for learning, knowledge sharing and 
experience-informed debate, and building a valued library of key resources (BEAM Annual 
Review, 2016). 
There are eight broad separate work streams constituting the programme’s current activities: 
1. Knowledge infrastructure: launching and maintaining the BEAM website, knowledge 
assets and communications capability. 
2. Communicating the approach: delivering accessible information, guidance and 
signposting to resources on market systems development. 
3. Evidence: enhance the evidence base to strengthen the credibility of the approach. 
4. Practical tools and solutions: deliver better tools and methods to address common 
challenges faced by practitioners.  
5. Learning networks: enabling a more extensive and effective community of practice for 
MSD. 
6. Skills and capabilities: enhancing quality and access to training, mentoring and 
coaching. 
7. Adaptive programming: endorsing policies to encourage more adaptive management 
practices. 
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8. Systemic change: generating better understanding and guidance about how to achieve 
systemic change, and to credibly measure it (BEAM Annual Review, 2016). 
The outputs of the Platform will provide improved coherence in the development of market 
systems approaches. The Platform will: 
 facilitate an efficient commission of research (coordinated amongst key users),  
 enable better evidence collection (via improved monitoring and evaluation guidance) and  
 provide practical guidance to those implementing projects on the ground.  
Thus, market systems approaches will become an increasingly relevant delivery method for a 
wider range of practitioners (BEAM Business Case, 2013). 
These outputs will contribute to the outcome level objective of the reinforced and extended 
development and application of market systems development policy and practice. The likely 
impact of the market systems development Platform is the improved impact and effectiveness of 
development programmes that highlight ‘making markets work for the poor’ as their objective. 
The eventual beneficiaries of the Platform will be poor people in market systems. By tackling the 
system-wide issues that prevent markets meeting the needs of poor people, an increase in the 
number of programmes adopting the approach will realize better market access and poor people 
being better able to gain the full rewards of their market interactions (BEAM Business Case, 
2013). 
Theory of Change 
The project delivers guidance on developing Theories of Change for M4P programmes. The 
theory of change represents the programme’s vision of how market systems will be functioning in 
the future, the pro-poor outcomes it will result in, and the effects it will have on poverty (BEAM, 
2019). 
See: Figure 3: Programme theory of change (BEAM), BEAM (2019) Theory of change. 
https://beamexchange.org/guidance/vision/theory-change/ 
 
Annual Reviews and Evaluations 
Year 2014 2015 2016  
Programme Score A A A  
Risk Rating Medium Medium Moderate  
Source: BEAM Annual Review (2016, p. 1). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
Recommendations from Annual Reviews and Evaluations (BEAM Annual Review, 2016) 
An External Review of the programme was conducted by WYG (2016). The core data source for 
this was key informant interviews with 39 practitioners, donors, designers of MSD projects and 
‘thought leaders’ from the field. Key learning includes: 
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1. Amongst key informants there is a clear mandate for the continuing existence of 
BEAM. The programme’s audience values the activities it provides. Support is also 
showed in the high attendance of the BEAM conference and the robust engagement 
within various sessions. 
2. The uniqueness of BEAM includes: its solid focus on MSD, its geographical focus (on 
European-based donors and suppliers), its strong brand, and its scale. 
3. The field that BEAM works in and the ambition of its objectives means that there are 
numerous difficult dichotomies it must traverse, with interviewees often giving 
different views. 
a. These include: complexity versus simplicity (parts of the audience are new to 
MSD and need clear English, other parts are experts requiring technical debate) 
and facilitative versus directive approaches (there is a trade-off between inviting 
key thinkers together in a neutral space and guiding what the field should focus 
on). 
4. The Theory of Change must to deliberate the variance in community needs. 
Different sub-groups have different needs, e.g. the desires of a team leader vary from 
new members of an MSD team. Similarly, donors may require a bespoke website section 
and/or further advocacy support. 
5. Website users are occasional rather than regular, naturally visiting the exchange in 
order to find specific answers rather than checking it regularly out of habit. Similarly, 
community contributions tend to be at the suggestion of BEAM staff rather than purely 
voluntary. 
6. The breadth of knowledge products on the BEAM site can make it hard for users to 
identify how much quality assurance the programme has delivered in each instance. 
7. There is still strong interest in supporting the use of MSD in ‘non-traditional’ 
sectors, notwithstanding the shift away from this area of activity at the last annual 
review. 
8. The debate around the MSD evidence base continues. Some informants think that the 
focus should now be on synthesising what exists, whilst others think more generation is 
needed. BEAM’s upcoming evidence paper and the online evidence map are aimed at 
better understanding these issues. 
9. There are numerous feasible scenarios for scale up or down of the programme, 
even if it is doubtful that any of its core activities will be commercially viable in the short to 
medium term. 
3.4. Jobs Compact Ethiopia 
Title:  Ethiopia Jobs Compact   
Programme Value: £80M  
Programme Code:  300393 Start Date: Feb 2017 End Date: Feb 2023 
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Source: Jobs Compact Annual Review (2018). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
 
The Ethiopian Jobs Compact will back the industrialisation efforts of Government of 
Ethiopia. It plans to create over 100,000 jobs for Ethiopians and refugees residing in the nation. 
DFID’s contribution will fulfil the promise made by the Prime Minister of the UK to support the 
Compact (BBC, 2016) through an £80 million contribution to the $560 million overall estimated cost 
(Jobs Compact Business Case, 2018; Jobs Compact Annual Review, 2018).   
The programme would match international support for job creation in Ethiopia and to the eventual 
easing of labour market restrictions – so that 30,000 refugees can participate in the labour 
market. The programme funding will support enhancements in the investment climate, promotion 
of investment, labour productivity, and advancing environmental and social standards in the local 
manufacturing sector. This will help create over 100,000 jobs, especially for women working 
in export-oriented sectors like garments.  To guarantee that refugees are capable of benefit 
from job generation in the wider economy, assistance would be delivered to realize essential 
legislative changes, training, relocation, and re-housing. Furthermore, protective procedures will 
be provided for vulnerable groups (Jobs Compact Business Case, 2018). 
The delivery structure (i.e. of the £80 million of DFID support) constituted three separate 
components. The delivery process was also organised over a six years period: 
(i) A contribution of £50 million channelled via the World Bank.  This would constitute 
of £40 million set aside for a ‘Programme for Results’ operation (payments to realize 
delivery of Compact commitments) and £10 million to fund specific government spending 
operations – which, for instance, includes the training and relocation of refugees that 
participate in the programme.  
(ii) A technical assistance package of £20 million provided to the World Bank. This will 
be used to support the Ethiopian government in carrying out the necessary reforms to 
attract investors and ascertain that the domestic manufacturing sector fulfils key 
international benchmarks of sustainability. 
(iii) An additional £10m of the budget will be managed by DFID. This amount will be used 
to finance the unblocking of unanticipated hindrances; enable refugee agencies to 
support the programme; and carrying out monitoring and evaluation (also on the impact 
on onward migration) (Jobs Compact Business Case, 2018).   
Theory of Change 
The overarching objective of the Jobs Compact programme in Ethiopia is to generate 
economic opportunities for both Ethiopians and refugees hosted by the country. To attain 
this, the Compact will back the industrialisation strategy of the Ethiopian Government with the 
target of job creation. In addition to this, a set of reforms and interventions will enable refugees 
to profit from job opportunities that are created within the Ethiopian economy. The emphasis 
on industrialisation is because of the need to both generate jobs directly and to support the political 
and economic circumstance in which labour market access is made open - without putting too 
much pressure on host communities in Ethiopia.  
Figure 4: Programme theory of change (Ethiopian Jobs Compact) 
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Source: Jobs Compact Business Case (2018, p. 23).  Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
The delivery of outputs (leading to achievement of outcomes) is based on three main headline 
assumptions (Jobs Compact Business Case, 2018).  
I. The quality of the outputs will be important – both in terms of their technical 
trustworthiness as well as the way in which they are shaped and provided to the special 
circumstances in Ethiopian. The soft-skills training to both Ethiopian citizens and refugee 
workers is a useful example in this regard.   
II. The capacity and commitment of the government to deliver on the very large number 
of concurrent reforms and investment projects through its industrialisation agenda and 
the added commitment on refugee rights. The provision of effective cross cutting external 
support to strengthening institutions (i.e. under Workstream 6 “Embedded approaches to 
adaptive implementation” of Figure 2) will be important to this result. 
III. The coordination of all stakeholders will be fundamental to make sure that financial 
resources flow in a predicable manner and appropriate disbursements are realized on the 
financial aid from the World Bank, DFID and EU. The selection will be based on the 
following criteria, as this process begins. Namely:   
o The relevance to Jobs Compact’s ‘economic opportunities’ objective; 
o Motivation to drive impact (which will focus on results of the ground); 
o Simplicity; 
o Scalability, i.e. if interventions can be spread over several years to reinforce the 
momentum of reforms; 
o Timeliness, i.e. – in order to achieve a suitable disbursement pattern; and 
o Ease of Verification. 
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Annual Reviews 
Year 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Programme Score A      
Risk Rating Major      
Source: Jobs Compact Annual Review (2018, p. 1). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0  
So far, it was not possible to ‘formally’ assess the contribution of the programme to the 
expected outcomes (as noted in DFID’s latest annual review from year 2018). This is because 
the programme has not yet gone into full implementation. However, a simple look at the expected 
results and the ‘innovative’ nature of the project (i.e. in the way it tries to combine employment 
opportunities for local communities as well as refugees) makes it interesting enough. Overall, the 
program also received an ‘A’ score in 2018 (Jobs Compact Annual Review, 2018). 
Recommendations from annual reviews and evaluations (Annual Review, 2018) 
1. The SROs of the Jobs Compact and the Refugees and Migration programme should 
decide on an internal coordination mechanism and work together - e.g. conducting joint 
reviews, field trips and partnership management. The SROs should exploit the findings of 
the DFID funded national and regional refugee-host community context analysis to agree 
on a DFID Ethiopia (DFID-E) wide engagement approach on the refugee integration 
agenda. 
2. DFID and World Bank must engage at multiple levels to safeguard the momentum gained 
so far in the policy area of refugee employment continues.   
3. The Jobs Compact SRO and the Private Sector Lead of DFIDE should work with partners 
such as ILO, EIC, World Bank and MoLSA to guarantee that work around DLI3 (i.e. 
establishment of functioning labour units in industrial parks) involves sustainable 
approaches that will strengthen the integration of in-park labour issues with the government 
institutions that have the directive and expertise to work on this area. 
4. DFIDE’s Economic Development Team must develop strategic engagement with MoLSA 
on the decent work agenda particularly concentrating on labour issues in the manufacturing 
sector.   
5. There should be better coordination between IFC’s investment climate programme and 
other DFID programmes operating in the same space particularly the Tax Systems 
Transformation Programme (TSTP) that support tax administration and Ethiopian 
Investment Advisory Facility (EIAF II) that engages in the area of trade logistics.  DFID 
should introduce the IFC Investment Climate team to the TSTP team and ask that they 
coordinate and report back on coordination efforts.   
6. There are complementarities between DFIDE’s Strengthening Host and Refugee 
Population Economy programme (SHARPE) and the Employment Promotion and 
Protection (EPP) pilot project. Teams should facilitate co-learning and partnership on 
systems/enabling environment that are vital for refugees to engage in economic 
opportunities.  
7. The minimum standards required for the Employment Promotion and Protection (EPP) 
Pilot waged jobs need to adhere to decent work principles and comply with local labour 
legislation. They also need to consider realities of labour markets in developing countries. 
After consultations with key stakeholders, the programme should arrive at an optimal set 
of ‘decent work’ criteria that is both aspirational but realistic given the circumstances. 
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8. As the programme goes into full implementation, the governance structure of the Jobs 
Compact, especially the Technical Working Group, should be reinforced. The TWG should 
play an improved role in clarifying, mandating and guiding the roles of different players but 
also navigating the growing interest of other development partners in the programme.  
9. The programme’s implementation started in 2018/19 financial year; hence DFID 
Programme Team should closely work with partners to review and fine-tune future years’ 
financial forecasts.  Once there is a clear understanding between DFID, GoE and World 
Bank on the adjustments, adjustments to the relevant agreements should be processed. 
3.5. Dar es Salaam Urban Jobs Programme 
Title:  Dar es Salaam Urban Jobs Programme 
Programme Value: £10M  
Programme Code:  205092 Start Date: Feb 2018 End Date: Aug 2023 
Source: Dar Urban Jobs Annual Review (2019). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
Dar es Salaam (Dar) is on track to become a megacity of 10 million people by 2027 and, at the 
moment, the third fastest-growing city in Africa. Nevertheless, much of the city’s fast growth has 
been a ‘jobless growth’. Dar’s unemployment rate is 21.5%, compared to 10.3% nationally, and 
underemployment rates are much higher. With up to a million young people joining Tanzania’s job 
market annually, harnessing labour-intensive sectors that can generate jobs for the urban poor is 
a critical, and growing, challenge. UK support can improve Dar’s ability to generate productive jobs 
and catalyse economic transformation, while (at the same time) reducing poverty and vulnerability 
for its inhabitants (Dar Urban Jobs Annual Review, 2019). 
Dar Jobs is a proposed 5-year £10 million urban market systems programme, the aim of which is 
to catalyse sustainable change in sectors that have the capacity to create jobs and incomes for 
thousands of poor people, principally women and youth. The programme will start with activities in 
the manufacturing, waste and childcare sectors. Funds will be disbursed to designated businesses 
to risk share and test business models that can generate economic opportunities for the poor. 
Funds will also be used to directly fund activities enabling business, local government or civil 
society organisations to deal with constraints to development in the target sectors. Dar Jobs will 
provide £20 million in additional income for 55,000 beneficiaries through creation of approximately 
9,600 additional FTE jobs and augmented earnings within existing jobs (Dar Urban Jobs Annual 
Review, 2019). 
Theory of Change 
The theory of change shows that market-led solutions can deal with key limitations to 
competitiveness in the light manufacturing, childcare and waste sectors. This can help to realize 
improved enterprise performance and facilitate market entry of new enterprises, which in turn can 
lead to more incomes associated with the formation of new jobs and higher earnings in existing 
jobs (Dar Urban Jobs Business Case, 2018).  
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Figure 5: Programme theory of change (Dar es Salaam Urban Jobs) 
Source: Dar Urban Jobs Business Case (2018, p. 19). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
 
The connection between labour productivity, employment and incomes is multifaceted. Yet, there 
is evidence of a positive relationship between productivity and job creation, particularly in the case 
of product innovation. There is also some evidence that productive businesses tend to display not 
only higher job growth compared with other businesses, but also more inclusive growth. Finally, 
investments in innovation might result in gains in employment at the industry level even when there 
are losses at the company level. There is also evidence that it is job growth together with 
augmented productivity that leads to poverty reduction. Key assumptions will be tested by the 
programme results framework (Dar Urban Jobs Business Case, 2018). 
Recent evidences show that Tanzania’s employment generation was driven by smaller firms: the 
bulk of the recent employment growth in Tanzania came from the non-agricultural and largely 
informal private sector. Furthermore, the utmost contribution to labour productivity growth came 
from a relatively small sub-set of firms. Hastening employment in those firms has the potential to 
boost labour productivity by 1.3 percentage points (Dar Urban Jobs Business Case, 2018; Diao et 
al., 2016). 
The theory of change reveals how enterprise performance enhancements lead to new jobs from 
existing and new entrants (i.e. enterprises create jobs) and also to increased incomes in existing 
enterprises (i.e. quality of jobs improves). A representation of the theory of change, together with 
the key assumptions, is provided in the Figure 5.  These lower level theories of change are an 
important part of flexible programming where interventions are not pre-defined (Dar Urban Jobs 
Business Case, 2018). 
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Annual Reviews (Dar Urban Jobs Annual Review, 2019) 
Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Programme Score A     
Risk Rating Moderate     
Source: Dar Urban Jobs Annual Review (2019). Licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 
 
So far, the available annual review is a ‘light-touch’ – given that the program only started in 2018.  
The contract for the Dar Urban Jobs programme was ratified 18 October, with IPE Global, working 
with the unincorporated joint venture members, Springfield Centre for Business in Development 
Limited and Diligent Consulting Limited. The inception phase (spanning five and half-month) 
started around end October, thus the (latest) annual review in 2019 is mainly a forward-looking 
review that seeks to capture any issues identified early-on and establishes the core actions for the 
2019 reporting period.  
Recommendations and Key Points (Annual Review, 2019) 
10. DFID SRO and consortium will jointly decide on how to inform Government and other 
stakeholders and seek their input.  This will commence as soon as possible. The 
consortium plans to finalize a communications strategy, together with informative 
materials, by February 2019, but it may be essential to introduce the programme to some 
stakeholders ahead of that.   
 
11. The consortium should re-evaluate the significance of the selected sectors, given the time 
elapsed since the business case was concluded, taking into consideration Government 
priorities and shifts in the business environment. It should also update the early mapping 
of other relevant initiatives in the city and make sure that they are complementary.  
 
12. Together with the consortium leadership team, DFID SRO and programme manager 
should keep team capabilities under review over the inception period and ensure suitable 
levels of mentoring and other support is provided from the international offices of IPE and 
Springfield.    
 
13. DFID SRO should make sure that a multi-disciplinary team of advisers takes part from the 
inception phase, and to ensure that design decisions are informed by robust social, gender 
and political economy analysis. The consortium should set up clear responsibilities for 
women and youth results.   
 
14. The Consortium should plan early on about the programme’s safeguards approach, e.g. 
initial thoughts in the standard operating procedures, and guarantee that a comprehensive 
strategy is in place by May 2019.  
 
15. The Consortium will make sure that the proposed governance structure and processes 
incentivises pilots and depicts a clear procedure for moving from pilot to scale.  Market 
systems programmes are more effective when timely decisions are taken to scale or drop 
interventions, i.e. on the basis of performance.   
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16. The consortium should design a dashboard approach, which will allow complete oversight 
of the various interventions, comprehend how these contribute to impacts and outcomes, 
and back a fast decision-making process regarding scaling activities up or down.   
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